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Conflict of Laws-1961 Tennessee Survey (II)
Elliott E. Cheatham*
Jurisdiction of courts over foreign corporations is a developing subject.
Almost all aspects of it are touched on by decision or discussion in two
cases in different courts and under different statutes; one case was in the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, the other in the United States district court.
Tucker v. InternationalSalt Co.1 was an action in a state court in contract
and quasi-contract against a Pennsylvania corporation. According to the
stipulation of facts a traveling salesman of the corporation lived in Tennessee, spent about four days a month soliciting orders there, and reported
directly to his immediate superior in Louisiana. The orders, which came
to about $10,000 a year, were forwarded by the salesman or the customers
to the home office and were there accepted or rejected. Two or three
times the salesman had called on past due accounts, and in one case he
had received a check in payment. The plaintiff, relying on Tennessee
Code Annotated sections 20-217, -220, had process against the corporation
served on the salesman in the state. The stipulation of facts, however,
failed to show the plaintiff's claim related to any transaction within the
state. The trial court held a plea in abatement good and the service of
process void. The supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Swepston,
affirmed the judgment below on the ground that the traveling salesman was
"no more than a mere soliciting agent."
Shuler v. Wood2 was an action in tort in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee against two Pennsylvania corporations.
The principal defendant had made a subcontract with a prime contractor
of the Atomic Energy Commission for the fabrication and installation of
steel towers at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This defendant employed an intermediary found to be its agent to install the towers at a cost of $3,000,
about one-third of the amount of the defendant's subcontract. The plaintiff, an iron worker employed by the agent on the work, was injured when
a tower collapsed because of the alleged negligence of the agent. In
suing the foreign corporations the plaintiff relied on Tennessee Code
Annotated section 48-923, and under that statute had process served on the
secretary of state on their behalf. The defendants moved to dismiss the
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; former President, Association of American
Law Schools; co-editor, Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold and Reese, Gases and Materialson Conflict of Laws (4th ed. 1957).
1. 349 S.W.2d 541 (Tenn. 1961).
2. 198 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
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action on the ground they were not subject to suit in the state. Judge
Taylor denied the motion.
The power of a state to subject a foreign corporation to suit raises a
federal question under the due process clause. The recent trend, as both
cases pointed out, is "'toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations ... ,'"3 especially when the cause of
action arises out of an activity in the state. The Shuler case is within the
trend, since the activities within the state were considerable and the cause
of action arose from them. In the Tucker case, where the cause of action
was unrelated to such activities, the answer is not clear. The leading case
on the subject, which upheld a suit in Ohio against a foreign corporation
4
on an out-of-state cause of action, put the issue in these vague terms
"[W~lhether ...the business done in Ohio ...was sufficiently substantial
and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action
against a foreign corporation, where the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio."
Granting the state has judicial jurisdiction under the federal constitution,
there is the question of state law: whether the state statutes authorize the
court to exercise the jurisdiction in the case before it. The answer is
obvious when the foreign corporation has qualified to do business in the
state and, in compliance with the statute, has assented to suit against it.
The corporations in these two cases, however, had not qualified, and
counsel for the plaintiffs relied on different statutes that use separate
measures of corporate activity in authorizing suit against a foreign corporation. Tennessee Code Annotated sections 20-217, -220, in the title,
"Civil Procedure," subjects a foreign corporation to suit "so far as relates
to any transaction had, in whole or in part, within this state, or any
cause of action arising here" or "having any transaction with persons, or
having any transaction concerning any property situated in this state,
through any agency whatever, acting for it within the state . . . ." This
was the statute relied on in the Tucker case. The facts stipulated failed
to satisfy the statute as they did not show the transaction was within the
state. Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-923, in the title, "Corporations
and Associations," makes the foreign corporation amenable to suit through
language which may not be met by a single corporate transaction and
appears to require some element of continuity; that is, doing business. The
key language in this section is: "any foreign corporation who shall do
business in Tennessee" and "any civil action .. .arising out of such .. .
business done in this State . . . ." This was the section relied on in the
Shuler case. It clearly reaches the case, as there was substantial cor3. Shuler v. Wood, supra note 2, at 803.
4. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-904 (1956).

1962 ]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

porate activity in the state out of which the cause of action arose. The
other section, Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-220, it would appear,
also extends to the case.
In the Shuler case, however, there was a preliminary question. In this
matter does the policy of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins6 apply so that the federal
court follows the law of the state in which it sits; or do the federal courts
have their independent standard? Judge Taylor held that the Erie policy
applies, constraining him to follow the Tennessee "statute, as construed by
the Tennessee courts."7 There had been no reported decision interpreting
this statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-923, on the meaning of
"do business." The federal court looked to the interpretation the Tennessee courts had given to a statute on qualification by foreign corporations,
which employs somewhat different language as the measure of activity
requiring qualification, "engage in any character of intrastate activity."8
Guided by these decisions it believed to be analogous, the court found
the activity would bring the corporation within the statutory provision
that authorizes suit.9
In these cases there is the additional question of appropriate notice to
the defendant. This question, too, takes the double form of federal law
and of state law: Does the notice meet the due process requirement of the
United States Constitution, and does it also comply with the terms of the
state statute? In the matter of notice, unlike the matter of state jurisdiction
mentioned above, the interpretation of due process has adhered to strictness
of requirement, that is, 10 "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." In both cases
the due process requirement was met: in the Tucker case, because there
was personal service on the defendant's principal representative in the
state; in the Shuler case because the secretary of state on whom service
was made was required to send a certified copy of the summons to the
defendants by registered mail." The applicable state statutes were satisfied in the Tucker case, and also in the Shuler case where the Federal Rules
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. Shuler v. Wood, supra note 2, at 803-04. The Supreme Court of the United
States has not passed on the question and the courts of appeals, as Judge Taylor

points out, are divided in opinion.
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-902 (1956).
9. The analogy of the qualification cases to the subjection to suit cases is a
questionable one, at least on the constitutional law level, as Justice Douglas pointed out
in a vigorous dissent in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
But as a higher degree of activity is ordinarily required for qualification than for
subjection to suit, the decisions on the former subject may have an a fortiori bearing
on the latter. See Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 1018,

1024 (1925).
10. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 310 (1950).
11. TENN. COPE ANN.§ 48-925 (1956).

846

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 15

of Civil Procedure authorize the federal court to follow in this matter the
law of the state in which it is sitting.12
12. FED.R. Cv. P. 4(d) (7).

